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Receipts, radicalisation, reactionaries, and repentance: the digital 
dissensus, fandom, and the COVID-19 pandemic 
Penny Andrews 
University of Sheffield 
 
 
This essay aims to illustrate how the concept of Òdigital dissensusÓ (Penny Andrews in An Xiao 
Mina 2018) applies to the current state of politics and the public sphere, exacerbated by 
international ÒlockdownsÓ as a result of COVID-19. The digital dissensus describes the current 
period in politics, where the liberal consensus of the 1980s onwards has collapsed and the 
internet and social media have become forums for noisy debate and extremist voices. The essay 
argues that lockdowns have created the conditions for an intensification of already polarising 
fandoms in politics and activism online, as well as an intensification of the inequalities and 
exclusions within offline political activism. Coronavirus has made it difficult to escape the calls 
of the powerful to bring an end to Òcancel cultureÓ (Elliot Ackerman et al. 2020) returning to an 
imagined version of liberal hegemony and denying accountability to the marginalised. 
 It is not only difficult to live through a pandemic that requires us to work, socialise and 
engage in political organising predominantly online. We are also doing this during a period of 
profound and loud fragmentation and disagreement on many issues that do not neatly split into 
left and right, Leaver and Remainer, disabled and able-bodied, straight versus queer or any other 
easy divisions. At the same time, we are witnessing the radicalisation of previously innocuous 
celebrities, secondary trauma from attacks on minority communities to which we and the people 
we care about belong, fallout from racism, abuse within popular culture and politics fandom, and 
the digital revelation of problematic faves. Meanwhile we also have to struggle with our caring 
responsibilities to our families, our communities and ourselves. To belong to minority groups 
and be clinically vulnerable during COVID-19 is a trip, and to retreat to the comforts of fandom 
and physical spaces is no longer untroubled. 
 
 2 
Digital dissensus and fandom 
 
ÒFor me, fandom is a really useful way of looking at the way people respond to politicians and political 
parties in a contemporary context --- not just because politicians are celebrities of sorts, but because the old 
ways of understanding politics have broken down. We had the post-war consensus, then the (neo)liberal 
consensus, and now we are somewhere else entirely --- what I call a digital dissensus, quick to jump to 
outrage and fragmented into echo chambers.Ó (Andrews in Mina 2018) 
 
We should understand the digital dissensus as beginning with the economic crash of 
2008, and its fallout still continues and intensifies online. While the concept of ÒinterregnumÓ, a 
period where the liberal world order is in crisis, and its potential are not irrelevant to this 
discussion, the overuse of that particular quotation (Antonio Gramsci 1971) by the likes of 
Gramsci admirer Michael Gove makes the idea invoked too broad for this particular moment in 
history. Gramsci could not have predicted the sheer relentless nature of a device in your hand 
and solidarity in which it is so difficult to trust, or situations in which agency over the new being 
reborn seem so remote. The initial fragments of hegemonic ideologies --- big groups such as 
Somewheres and Anywheres (David Goodhart 2017) or Remainers and Leavers, Populists and 
Liberals, Internationalists and Nationalists, Corbynites and Blairites --- are fracturing further, 
falling out with each other and forming smaller groups with ever more distinct characteristics 
and concerns. 
Fandom is not just for popular or even high culture, it can attach itself to any media 
property. What makes a fan part of a fandom rather than just the fan base (a group of non-
networked people who enjoy the same cultural object on their own or with friends) is the sense 
of community and identity that comes from purposefully joining in. Social media acts as an 
intensifier, and the fans are the people you hear most often and associate most with a cultural or 
political property in the digital dissensus. The most hardcore fans and anti-fans share receipts 
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(screenshots of evidence, such as private messages or previous social media posts) in order to 
defend or discredit big names in their field and will cause social media Òpile-onsÓ or even 
organised (via private group chats) ÒbrigadingÓ of individuals that are experienced as high-
volume attacks. Many receipts have been shared during lockdown, as stans and anti-fans have 
the time to collect and disseminate the information, and new industries get their own #MeToo 
moments (Sarah Banet-Weiser 2018) as creatives discover feminism or become bolder due to 
COVID-19 pausing or even ending their employment, and therefore immediate risk to their 
careers from speaking out is lessened. The reduction of social contact caused by COVID-19 has 
hastened and deepened these processes. 
 
Communities and accountability 
The deliberative space allowed by the shutdown of physical events and workplaces has created 
opportunities online for some communities to fracture and heal. Black Lives Matter (BLM) 
evolved from a moment to gaining mainstream acceptance as a widespread movement across the 
world, following the brutal murder of George Floyd. Awareness driven by BLM and the direct 
action it has inspired have forced accountability measures, promises of reparation payments, 
removal of offensive names and symbols such as statues, and driven profusive apologies from 
organisations and companies who have benefited from the subjugation of Black people. BLM 
pushed people onto the street to protest, declaring that structural racism is also a pandemic. 
These actions online and offline have also been met with violent resistance from white 
supremacists and professional controversialists, and repeated erroneous suggestions (Dhaval M. 
Dave et al. 2020) that BLM protests are or will be responsible for further COVID-19 outbreaks. 
Some Black peopleÕs social media accounts and email addresses have become unusable due to 
the deluge of death threats, and other people of colour supporting BLM aims Ñ such as 
Cambridge professor Priyamvada Gopal (Hannah Mirsky 2018; Joe Cook 2020) Ñ have received 
large volumes of abuse characterised by anti-Black slurs and tropes as well as ad hominem 
 4 
attacks. The online and offline activities cannot be separated, because they bleed into each other, 
and anti-Blackness is also a problem in non-white communities. Physical actions are reported by 
social media with photographs and videos and, often, provocative commentary. Online 
comments are reported in print newspapers and broadcast media, with editorialising that fails to 
recognise any difference between provocation and hate speech. Both arouse outrage in anti-
racists to protest and embolden bigots to act digitally and physically. 
BLM is not the only popular accountability movement gathering steam online during 
lockdown. The ÒThis you meme,Ó the #speakingout hashtag outing abuse and predation in pro 
wrestling, Twitter threads describing experiences of women and queer people in comics and 
stand-up comedy and blog posts about academic predators have all been widely discussed and 
are starting to change policies and processes. But with no access to many of the offline spaces 
and activities that offer physical comfort, quiet and private time with friends or the ability to 
escape screens when people need to be online all day for work, communities have become 
fractious and at times socially distant --- virtually as well as physically. Physical protest actions 
have always excluded many disabled and chronically ill people, but the dangers of the pandemic 
have reduced access to this outlet further and online protest events, while frequently organised 
and promoted, do not receive the same attention. Online memes, however, can have more 
impact. The ÒThis you?Ó meme calling out hypocrisy and asking for accountability surged in June 
2020 as lockdown in some places began to ease. The format originated on Black Twitter (Andr 
Brock 2012) which Ñ like a lot of Òonline cultureÓ Ñ tends to be Black, queer or both. 
Oppressed minorities develop their own language and practices, which are then appropriated and 
absorbed by majority groups. The meme quote tweets or screenshots a social media post and 
then provides ÒreceiptsÓ (evidence) that the person quoted is insincere or lying.  
The digital dissensus has been exacerbated by polarised opinions of the handling of 
COVID-19 by right-wing governments in UK, Brazil, India, and the US, and tendency of leftists 
to Òplay copÓ online on those from other factions and political traditions is an interesting tension 
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being surfaced by the digital dissensus: resistance and accountability versus policing of the 
behaviour and ability of individuals to change and develop. This type of thinking is not fully 
hegemonic in these communities but is also in conflict with BLM and socialist demands to 
defund the police and be more socially liberal and draws more criticisms from the centre and 
right in UK and US politics Ñ especially those intent on stoking a culture war between ÒpurityÓ 
and Òliberty.Ó The tradition of pluralism can be difficult to sustain in online spaces, when groups 
feel under threat.  
Communities develop and shatter around fandoms, favourites, hopes, and dreams. The 
pandemic made clap-worthy heroes and icons of UKÕs NHS and care workers and 100-year-old 
charity fundraiser Captain Tom Moore. Key figures like the UKÕs Chief Medical Officer Chris 
Whitty became the subject of multiple fan groups on Facebook and works of productive fandom 
from sculptures to mugs. COVID-19 has made people more emotionally reactive, and thankful 
for those who seem to be helpful and trustworthy. This can be seen to have drawn more people 
into this kind of fandom and away from the cynicism often expressed towards these 
attachments. It is seen as acceptable to wear a t-shirt featuring an epidemiologistÕs face, or cheer 
for ScotlandÕs First Minister Nicola Sturgeon during her daily television broadcasts and strong 
female leadership Ñ even if you disagree with her politics Ñ because COVID-19 is all about 
expressing yourself with clapping, celebrating heroes and the newly-added ÒcareÓ reaction on 
Facebook. 
 
Politics fandom 
Politics fandom, my area of expertise, is a way of understanding the attachment and forceful 
emotional response to politics and politicians, and politicised fandoms explain the power of 
networked fans in activism. The mediaÕs --- and even academiaÕs --- gendered and disdainful 
response to fandom requires me to constantly defend the roles of emotion and rationality in 
politics and public life, and the harms caused by the stigma attached to fans and fandoms. Fans 
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are mocked by ÒsensibleÓ commentators for their attachment to and reliance on the popular, be 
it their favourite football team, politician, campaign, musicians or other favoured cultural 
property. Those feelings are thought to cloud decision-making and be laughable at best, even as 
the UKÕs Prime Minister is a publicly avowed fan of Winston Churchill, and the same 
commentators defend Victorian-era statues of slave traders or articulate a desire for the return of 
Obama or Tony Blair. The struggle for and against this culture, of consent and resistance (Stuart 
Hall 1998), is made more difficult by powerful voices in the media and politics popularising the 
stigma of doing so. Lockdown social media has been riddled with pained apologies and 
ÒrepentanceÓ messages from high status individuals who have been cancelled or feel wronged, 
often leading to the complainants being attacked for drawing attention to issues, and the 
reactionaries complaining that is they who are oppressed (Sara Ahmed 2015). Seen as causing us 
to spend too much time at home in our Òbubbles,Ó lockdowns have encouraged solipsism and 
anger. It is exhausting. Where is the freedom in constantly being engaged in the struggle, in 
fighting for what is right, unable to opt out? What peace there must be in being able to discard 
feelings or not have them at all, confident that your own needs and desires and identity (political 
or otherwise) will be met and protected by power. Where the digital dissensus collides with all 
this is that recent research (James Johnson 2020) shows that the general public arenÕt actually 
engaged with these attempts at culture war --- even the toppling of statues and battles over 
Winston ChurchillÕs legacy --- but the noisiest fragments are the ones that get most traction in 
the media. Predators and racists are outed as abusers, but many do not notice as communities 
split between those online too much as a way of coping, and those not at all able to engage. 
Women and minorities are given the opportunity to speak up in the new digital spaces created by 
COVID-19, but they are not necessarily heard. 
 
 7 
Paying the price 
Women, people of colour, disabled people and LGBTQ+ people are still doing the bulk of the 
emotional labour (Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha 2017) around and through the pandemic. 
They are running lockdown activities for fans and minority communities, managing peopleÕs 
feelings as fallout from accountability processes continue, volunteering for new roles as directors 
and diversity leads as organisations try to improve their conduct, taking on extra work in their 
paid jobs because they are parents, or taking on extra work because they are not parents and are 
expected to absorb all of the unsociable tasks and hours. They are also the most vulnerable to 
job cuts (International Labour Organization 2020), as they are more likely to work part-time or 
in precarious roles and short-term contracts that are not renewed, and most vulnerable to 
performance management initiatives, as the burden of managing life and work through COVID-
19 takes its toll on their productivity. 
Across society, politics and digital governance there are very real opportunities for lasting 
change, as moments deepen into movements and then more, but also the likelihood of lasting 
scars that may make the issues of the dissensus and the inequalities it exposes ultimately less 
visible and treatable. As with Brexit and the 2008 financial crash before it, much can be 
attributed by governments and the media to the traumas of the event itself and the economic 
depression that follows --- rather than individual and systemic problems that require solutions 
beyond waiting it out. This becomes more apparent as we lurch from one crisis to the next and 
the previous issues of greatest salience drop out of view: in June 2020, Brexit was only ranked by 
6% of respondents as the most important issue to UK citizens (Ipsos MORI 2020), a drop of 
over 40% since January 2020. ÒTake care,Ó work emails say. ÒStay well.Ó The replies for those 
who survive the pandemic may simply read ÒIÕm still here.Ó 
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